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Zablotsky: Punitive Damages

LIMITS ON PREEMPTION AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: CAN THEY BE RELATED?

Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Our final speaker is one of Touro's superb professors, Peter
Zablotsky.* His area of expertise is products liability, which is

reflected in his writings and in the conferences he has
conducted. 1 Professor Zablotsky teaches torts and other subjects
at this institution and is particularly qualified to talk about the
two cases that involved torts and product liability. So it is my

pleasure now to introduce to you Professor Peter Zablotsky.
ProfessorPeter Zablotsky:
Two cases from this past term affect state tort law. The cases
are BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore2 and Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr.3 Ironically, the Medtronic case, which did not articulate
* Professor of Law. Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
B.A.. Pennsylvania State University, 1977: J.D.. Columbia University School
of Law. 1980.
I. See Peter Zablotsky. Eliminating Proximate Cause As An Element Of
The Prima Facie Case For Strict Products Liability, 45 CArl. U. L. REv. 31
(1995); Peter Zablotsky, The Appropriate Role of PlaintiffMisuse In Products
Liability Causes Of Action, 10 TOURO L. REv. 183 (1993).
2. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996). See Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L REv. 135,
145 (1996) (commenting that the result of this case provides "little guidance to
either Legislatures or lower courts regarding the contours of the constitutional
limitations on excessive punitive damages awards."); Bruce 1. McKee. The
hnplications of BMW v. Gore for Future Punitive Damages Litigation:
Observationsfrom a Participant,48 ALA. L. REV. 175. 227 (1996) (stating
that "BMW may become more important for what it did not say rather than
what it did say.").
3. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). See Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine
Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's Effort To Regulate Tobacco Products, 48
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any new constitutional doctrine, is poised to have the greatest
impact on state tort law by virtue of the new prospective the
Court brought to interpreting and applying established
constitutional doctrine. 4 By contrast, the BMW case, which does
arguably articulate some new constitutional doctrine, does not
appear likely to have a significant impact on state tort law
5
because of the factual context within which the issue arose.
Since I would like to focus on impact, I am going to begin with
Medtronic.
Medtronic is a preemption case. The general constitutional
issue in that case is whether the Medical Devices Amendment of
1976 [hereinafter "the Act"] 6 preempts state tort causes of action
for manufacturing defect, design defect and failure to warn. 7 The
facts of the case are rather dramatic: a pacemaker dependent
patient had a pacemaker implanted in her chest. The device
worked for several years and then suddenly failed. 8 This failure
required emergency surgery, which the patient survived. 9 She
then brought the traditional common law product liability causes
of action. 10 Medtronic argued that these causes of action -manufacturing design, design defect and failure to warn -- were
preempted by the Medical Devices Amendment. I1
By way of brief background on the legislation: though it is
called an amendment, the legislation is really an act that stands

ALA.

L. REV. 1, 53 (1996) (commenting that "tobacco companies filed pre-

market notifications in the future, notwithstanding the Medtronic decision.");
Daniel G. Jarcho, Premarket Approval and Federal Preemption of Product
Liability Claims In The Wake of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 51 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 613 (1996) (analyzing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr and its effects on medical
devices and related tort claims).
4. See infra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.

5. See infra notes 39. 41-66 and accompanying text.
6. 21 U.S.C. § 360 (1996).

7. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
1l. Id.
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on its own. 12 It is yet another piece of legislation that gives the

FDA authority to regulate products for market, in this case
medical devices. The Act sets out a scheme of approval and
review that involves different levels of rigor. 13 The lowest level
of rigor is reserved for products that were already on the market
prior to the enactment of the Act -- a sort of grandfather clause as well as newer products that are substantially similar to these
grandfathered products. 14 The Supreme Court, in Justice
Stevens' opinion, estimated that it takes about 20 hours of effort
to satisfactorily complete this level of review. 15
12. 21 U.S.C. § 360. See Ashley W. Warren. Preemption Of Claims
elated To Class III Medical Devices: Are The Federal Objectives Of Public
Health and Safety Furthered Or Hindered?, 49 SMU L. REv. 619. 624 (1996)
(stating that the Medical Devices Act of 1976 was designed to compensate for
the inadequacies of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
13. The Act sets forth three classes of devices intended for human use. 21
U.S.C. § 360(c).
14. Id. at 2254. Class I devices pose the lowest threat to users and
therefore are subjected to the lowest level of regulation. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(1)(A) (1996). This section provides:
(A) Class 1, General Controls
(i) A device for which the controls authorized by or under section
351, 352, 360, 360f, 360h, 360i, or 360j or this title or any
combination of such sections are sufficient to provide reasonable
assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device.
(ii) A device for which insufficient information exists to
determine that the controls referred to in clause (i) are sufficient to
provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the
device or to establish special controls to provide such assurance, but
because it-(I) is not purported or represented to be for a use in
supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human
health, and
(II) does not present a potential unreasonable risk of
illness or injury,
is to be regulated by the controls referred to in clause (i).
Id. See Frank D. Nguyen, Comment, Regulation of Medical Erpert Systems: A
Necessary Evil?, 34 SANTA Ct.AaA L. REV. 1187, 1206 (1994) (stating that
Class I devices include tongue depressors, ice bags, bed pans and elastic
bandages).
15. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2247.
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The highest level of rigor, a Class III review, requires 1,200 or

16
more hours of effort in order to be satisfactorily completed.
The pacemaker at issue was approved pursuant to the lowest tier
set out by the Act. 17
The Act also has some express preemption language. 18 It is the
type of language that we see with some frequency in Federal

16. Id. at 2247-48. Class III devices are subject to the highest level of
regulation. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) . This section provides in pertinent part:
(C) Class III, Premarket Approval
A device which because-(i) it (I) cannot be classified as a class I device because insufficient
information exists to determine that the application of general
controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety
and effectiveness of the device, and (II) cannot be classified as a
class II device because insufficient information exists to determine
that the special controls described in subparagraph (B) would
provide reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness, and
(ii)(l) is purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or
sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance
in preventing impairment of human health, or
(II) presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury,
is to be subject, in accordance with section 360e of this title, to
premarket approval to provide reasonable assurance of its safety and
effectiveness ...
Id. See Nguyen. supra note 12 (stating that Class III medical devices include
pacemakers, artificial hearts, and artificial joints).
17. Medironic, 116 S. Ct. at 2254.
18. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1997). This section states:
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect
with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement -(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device
under this chapter.
(b) Exempt requirements
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the
Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and
opportunity for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this
section, under such conditions as may be prescribed in such
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Legislation. Specifically, Section 360-k of the Act states that any
state requirement that is in addition to or different from a
requirement imposed by the Act or by the FDA is preempted. 19
The Act also says that any state requirement that is related to a
20
medical device is preempted.
Medtronic argued that design defect, manufacturing defect and
failure to warn causes of action were preempted by this Section
360-K statutory language. 2 1 The Court rejected all of
Medtronic's arguments and held that none of these causes of
action were preempted. 22 The Court reasoned that while it is, of
course, possible for a state tort cause of action to qualify as a
requirement that would be deserving of preemption, the
manufacturing defect, design defect and the failure to warn
causes of action were more in the nature of general duties not
specifically related to medical devices, and therefore not
warranting preemption. 23
I found the rather narrow interpretation of the Section 360-k
preemption language surprising for a number of reasons. First, as
Justice Breyer points out in his concurring opinion, it is
inevitable that a conflict will arise between jury findings in
design defect causes of action involving pacemakers in FDA
regulation, a requirement of such State or political subdivision
applicable to a device intended for human use if-

(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under
this chapter which would be applicable to the device if an exemption
were not in effect under this subsection; or
(2) the requirement (A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause
the device to be in violation of any applicable requirement under
this chapter.
Id.
19. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2249. See Duncan v. lolab Corp.. 12 F.3d

194 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Medical Device of 1976 preempted
patient's state law claims).
20. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2257 n. 18.
2 I.Id. at 2251.
22. Id. at 2251 (finding Medtronic's argument "not only unpersuasive,
[but] implausible.").
23. Id. at 2253.
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requirements. As an example, Justice Breyer postulates an FDA
approved pacemaker that uses a one inch component as part of its
design. 24 Then, in a subsequent design defect cause of action, a

state jury determines that a two inch component was more
suitable under the risk benefit test 25 or the consumer expectation
24. See Brantner v. Black & Decker Mfg., Co., 831 F. Supp. 460, 463
(W.D.Pa. 1993). "The plaintiff must show, in a design defect case brought
tinder a negligence theory, some information about the scope of the risk known
to the defendant at the time of the marketing of the product." Id. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section, entitled
"Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer" provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
25. Medironic, 116 S.Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J.concurring). See Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973) (stating
the seven factors to be weighed in making a risk benefit analysis). The seven
factors include:
I) The usefulness and desirability of the product--its utility to
the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product--the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care and
the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the danger inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge
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test, 2 6 and that the one inch design is inferior. 27 Accordingly, the
requirement of a two inch design, as imposed by the state design
defect cause of action, directly conflicts with a design approved
by the FDA pursuant to the Act. Justice Breyer concludes that
there is the potential for conflict, if not an already realized
28
conflict, between the Act and a design defect cause of action.
Though well reasoned, this position did not carry the day.
Indeed, as stated earlier, Justice Breyer concurred in the finding
of no preemption; perhaps even he was not quite convinced by
his own argument, but his point is nonetheless well taken.
Second, I think that the preemption holding in the Medtronic
case is a surprise in light of what the Court did in Cipollone '.
Liggett Group, Inc. 29 just a few years ago. Cipollone is a 1992
of the obvious condition of the product, and of the existence of
suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading
the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance.
Id. at 837-38. See also Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories. 479 A.2d 374 (N.J.
1984); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In
Carroll Towing, Judge Learned Hand articulated his famous risk benefit
analysis of negligence, however, in that case, custom prevailed over the cost
benefit analysis. Id. at 173.
26. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2259-60. See Soule v. General Motors Corp..
882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994) (holding that the "consumer expectation test is
reserved for cases in which the everyday experience of the product's users
permits a conclusion that the product's design violated minimum safety
assumptions, and is thus defective regardless of expert opinion about the merits
of the decision.").
27. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2259-60.
28. Id. at 2263 (Breyer, J., concurring).
29. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). In Cipollone, a suit was brought against a
cigarette manufacturer alleging that smoking cigarettes caused one to develop
lung cancer and subsequently die. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F.
Supp. 1146, 1149 (D.N.J. 1984) (noting that Mrs. Cipollone smoked Liggett's
cigarettes for over forty years). Cipollone claimed, inter alia, that the
cigarettes were defectively designed, Liggett failed to adequately warn of the
health risks of smoking and that Liggett's advertising fraudulently
misrepresented the product. Id. at 1149. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the Federal Cigarette Act of 1969 impliedly preempted state
claims against cigarette manufacturer for inadequate warnings and for the
propriety of the manufacturer's advertising. See Feldman v. Lederle
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case that dealt with a cigarette label. It is a visible case, and has
been subject to significant analysis. 30 The case involved a smoker
who brought a number of state tort actions, including failure to
warn and other related actions, against a cigarette
31
manufacturer.
The cigarette manufacturer argued that these causes of action
were preempted by the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
[hereinafter "the Cigarette Labeling Act"] 32 and other related
Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (holding that a failure to warn claim
against a manufacturer of tetracycline was implicitly preempted). Not all
courts, however, find that a federal statute preempts a plaintiff's product
liability claim. See. e.g.. Murphy v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 650 F.
Supp. 922 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that there was no preemption because the
state's common law did not attempt to regulate an aspect of performance
controlled by federal regulations). On certiorari, in Cipollone, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Federal Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 did
not preempt state law damages actions. Cipollone. 505 U.S. at 517.
30. See. e.g., Daniel B. Nelson, No Causefor Relief." FIFRA's Preemptive
Scope After Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 95 ANN. SURV. AM. L 565,
(1996): Jeffrey R. Stem, Preemption Doctrineand the Failureof Textualism in
Cipollone v. Ligget Group, 80 VA. L. REv. 979 (1994); Heather Vallee
Kehoe, Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc. -- Narrowing the Scope of Federal
Preemption: Tobacco Torts Become Winnable, 38 LOY. LAW. REv. 1191
(1993).
31. /d. at 508-10
32. Id. at 510. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988). Section 1331 establishes
the Congressional declaration of policy and purpose stating:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to
establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette
labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health, whereby:
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette
smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a
warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A)
protected to the maximum extent consistent with this
declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and
advertising regulations with respect to any relationship
between smoking and health.
Id. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1992 & Supp. 1997). Section 1333 provides:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or
import for the sale or distribution within the United States any
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acts. 33 The Cigarette Labeling Act is the act which requires
warnings on cigarette packages. 34 In the Cigarette Labeling Act,
the preemption language is actually a bit softer than Section 360K of the Medical Devices Amendment. The Cigarette Labeling
Act simply says that any state requirement based upon promotion
or advertising is preempted. 35 Yet, the Court interpreted this
language very broadly. The Court said that this language
preempted not only state tort causes of action with respect to
marketing or promotion, but any action with respect to research,
36
development, sale, and failure to warn.
In 1992, when the Court preempted these causes of action, this
was a significant blow to plaintiffs. The holding eliminated a
significant number of state tort causes of action as applied to this
product. I think the Cipollone Court would have eliminated the
design defect cause of action as well, but that action was not
before the Court. With these causes of action eliminated in
Cipollone based upon relatively general preemption language, I
think it was expected, at least I expected, that in Medtronic the
Court would find much more specific preemption, and at the very
least preempt the design defect cause of action with respect to this
pacemaker. But that did not happen: again, the Court kept intact
all of these causes of action. What we are left with, then, is a
cigarettes for the package of which fails to bear. in accordance with
the requirements of this section, one of the following labels:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung
Cancer. Heart Disease, Emphysema. And May Complicate
Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now
Greatly Reduces Serious Risks To Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant
Women May Result In Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low
Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains
Carbon Monoxide.
Id.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 510.

Id. at 509.
at 511.
Id.
Id. at 511-12.
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new perspective, and really a more pro-plaintiff prospective, that
keeps alive all of these causes of action.
A few final points. With respect to how much we can expect
product liability causes of action to survive in the face of federal
legislation that is right on point. Medtronic does, by its holding,
leave standing all of the critical causes of action. For several
reasons, however, it is difficult to know whether this will
continue and ultimately become the prevailing view. First, in
Medtronic, the Court was very careful to point out that its
holding was influenced by the fact that the lowest level of review
was applied to the pacemaker. 37 The Court noted that if the
highest standard of review had been applied to a pacemaker, the
result might well have been different. 38 This suggests that if a
manufacturer avails itself to the more rigorous FDA review, it
might get the benefit of preemption. The problem with this is that
the manufacturers do not want to subject their product to rigorous
FDA review. In fact, in the next part of its analysis, the Court
points out that almost all products that are approved by the FDA
pursuant to the Medical Devices Amendment use the lowest
standard of review. In that sense, the manufacturers have become
their own worst enemy in limiting preemption.
Another event that I think will enhance the impact of Medtronic
is the relationship of the case to some of the legislative proposals
with respect to products liability. Those of you who follow the
area know that one of the proposed tort reforms in the product
liability area is to make compliance with regulations an absolute
defense. Proponents of this view argue that if a manufacturer
complies with some kind of FDA regulation, that is more than
evidence of a good design; it is, in fact, absolute evidence of a
good design. The Court had the opportunity to adopt this view by
preempting the state causes of action and making FDA
compliance an absolute defense, and they chose not to. Thus,

37. Medironic, 116 S. Ct. 2247, 2254 (noting that Medtronic was only
required to comply with "'general standards' - the lowest level of
protection.").
38. Id. at 2255.
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even though there was no constitutional doctrine announced, I
think the case is likely to have a significant impact.
This could be contrasted with the other case from the term,
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.39 The BMW case is not a
preemption case. Instead, it is a case involving excessive punitive
damages. The constitutional issue here is whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment4 0 protects a state
41
litigant from an excessive punitive damage award.
The facts in this case are almost of the type that we would
expect to see on "Hard Copy" or "A Current Affair." A
purchaser of a new BMW who owned the car for nine months,
took the car in for some detailed work and learned, at that point,
that his new BMW, had been repainted. 42 It had been repainted
because it had been slightly damaged at the factory. But while the
factory repainted it, they didn't tell him. 43 Consequently. the
purchaser brought an action for fraud under Alabama law. 44 The
jury found that he was entitled to $4,000 in compensatory
damages. 45 They then gave him $4 million in punitive damages
on the theory that BMW had engaged in a past practice of
concealment and nondisclosure with respect to minor factory
damage. 4 6 This award was reduced to $2 million by the highest
39. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states in
pertinent part: "No State shall... deprive to any person of life. liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... ." Id.
41. BMW of North America, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1592-93 (stating that
"It]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State
from imposing 'grossly excessive' punishment on a tortfeasor").
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1593 (noting that BMW failed to disclose that the car had been
repainted).
44. Id. at n.3. ALA. CODE § 6-5-102 (1993). Section 6-5-102 of the
Alabama statues provide for an action for fraud provides: -Suppression of a

material fact which the party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes
fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations
of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case." Id.
45. BMW of North America. Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1593.

46. Id. at 1594 (noting that the jury based the punitive damages award "on
a determination that the nondisclosure policy constituted 'gross, oppressive or
malicious' fraud.").
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court in Alabama. 47 The case then went up to the Supreme
Court.
In deciding the case, the Court defined a new aspect of a
constitutional right. The majority in the BMW case stated that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does place a
limit on grossly excessive constitutional damages, and that there
is a constitutional right to be free of grossly excessive tort
damages. 48 The Court reasoned that our constitutional
jurisprudence has embodied in it principles of fairness, and that
the Fourteenth Amendment is, apparently, the repository of these
principles. 49 As part of this Fourteenth Amendment fairness, a
litigant is required to be on notice as to the severity of the
penalty. 50 If the penalty is too severe with respect to the notice
given the litigant, a constitutional violation occurs. The Court
articulated factors to determine when we have grossly excessive
punitive damages. The Court suggested that we look to how
reprehensible the conduct is, the mathematical ratio of
compensatory to punitive damages, and the amount of civil
penalty that could be imposed in relationship to the punitive
damage award.51
In the BMW case, the Court concluded that BMW's conduct
was not particularly reprehensible. 5 2 First, it involved only
simple economic harm. 53 Second, BMW's conduct was, in fact,
explicitly legal in 25 states. 54 Most states that deal with this
problem do not require the manufacturer to disclose "minor"
damage. The damage in the BMW case would have qualified as
minor damage. 55 Third, there was no recklessness with respect to

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.

at 1595.
at 1598.
at 1601-03.
at 1599.

53. Id.

54. Id. at 1594 (arguing that if BMW's conduct was legal in these
jurisdictions, there is no basis for a punitive damage award).
55. Id. at 1600.
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public health or safety. Thus, the Court felt that the conduct was
not reprehensible.
I think the most interesting part of this opinion is the next part
of the opinion where the Court talks about the mathematics
involved. Here, the Court states that the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages is 500 to 1.56 The Court does not really
say anything more, except to deny that this ratio is the
determining factor. 57 The Court insists that there is no bright
line, and that there can not possibly be a bright line when judging
whether damages are unconstitutionally excessive. But the Court
reminds us that this ratio was 500 to 1.
Finally, the Court looked at the civil penalty involved. 58 They
determined that the most severe civil penalty that could be
assessed was $10,000, 59 and that $2 million is obviously in
excess of that. 60 Because of this imbalance, the state's interest
fails in light of this three part test. The constitutional test is not
61
passed, and the damages are held to be excessive.
I guess today is the day to quote scathing critiques written by
Justice Scalia, because he once again came forth with a scathing
critique and again used language such as, "[tihis is none of our
business." 62 That is how he starts his opinion. "This is none of
our business." The "us" being the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Scalia then wrote that there simply is no Fourteenth
63
Amendment due process right to a fair punitive damage award.
He stated that the Fourteenth Amendment has never been
interpreted this way in a civil case, and that there is no reason to
do it now. He also noted that the states already have
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 1602.
Id.
Id. at 1603.
Id.
Id.
id. at 1604.

62. BMW of North America. 116 S. Ct. at 1610. Justice Scalia stated that

"Islince the Constitution does not make [punitive damages].. any of our
business, the Court's activities in this area are an unjustified incursion into the
province of state governments." Id.
63. Id. at 1610 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that there is no federal
guarantee ensuring that a damage award be reasonable).
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reasonableness requirements in their state constitutions, and that
there is no need for the Federal Constitution to be read to impose
yet another level of reasonableness with respect to this type of
analysis.64
Justice Scalia went on to say that the test that the Court did
articulate was not helpful: that it essentially amounted to
"excessive punitive damages, I know them when I see them." He
claimed that the test is so vague as to render it useless.
Finally. Justice Scalia accuses the majority of simply not liking
the result and of having taken the case solely to correct a result it
did not like. 65 Thus. we have to ask whether there is some new
constitutional doctrine here, or the articulation of some aspect of
a constitutional right that really has never been articulated before,
or whether the majority simply did not like the result. Justice
Scalia answers the question by accusing the majority of having
cited no precedent. 6 6 The majority cites only some nineteenth
century precedent, which he finds inapplicable, and two recent
cases that the Supreme Court decided in 1990, Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Company v. Haslip,67 and 1993, TXO Production
64. Id. at 1612.
65. Id. at 1611.
66. Id. at 1611-13.

67. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). See Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc.
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (holding that punitive damages
awards are not violative of the Eighth Amendment). In Browning-Ferris,

however, the Court failed to resolve the due process challenge to punitive
damages awards. Id. at 276-77. Nevertheless. the Court, in Haslip, held that
punitive damages awards must be "fundamental[ly] fair[]" and not violative of
due process. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 33. The Supreme Court, however, refused to
"draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and
the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case." Id. at 18. But the
Court stated that punitive damages awards, which are outrageous or greatly
unproportionate. may "'cross the line into the area of constitutional
impropriety."' Id. at 24-25. Accordingly. punitive damages awards must not
be "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense .... " Id at 22. See
generally S. Daniels & J. Martin, Myth And Reality In Punitive Damages, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990) (noting that several states enacted punitive
damages legislation); C. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1173 (1931) (discussing the problems associated with large and
unpredictable punitive damages awards).
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Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.6 8 Justice Scalia feels that the
court took these two recent cases, which were also punitive
damage cases, to build a trilogy culminating with the BMW case
and this final crystallization of the right. 6 9 I believe Justice Scalia
is saying that the Court has created some precedent over the last
five or six years for the sole purpose of articulating a new
Fourteenth Amendment right.

In trying to decide whether the Court is really doing that, or
whether it simply does not like the case, I think Justice Ginsburg
offers us the best insight. Justice Ginsburg says that there is a

reasonableness requirement with respect to punitive damage
awards; 70 that a limit does exist and should be protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 1 She goes

on to say that the Court has already articulated this requirement
in the 1990 and 1993 cases on punitive damages. 7 2 Furthermore,

Justice Ginsburg notes that the states have enshrined these
concepts in their constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, she found no
need to redo that in the BMW case. She continued that, at least
68. 509 U.S. 443 (1993). See D.C. Massey & M.A. Stem, Punitive
Damages and the Louisiana Constitution: Don't Leave Home Without It, 56
LA. L REv. 743 (1996) (discussing the consideration courts give to awards of
punitive damages). In TXO, where there was a "ten million-dollar punitive
damages award" for slander, the Supreme Court put the Haslip holding to a
test. Id. at 749. The actual damages award, however, for compensatory
damages, was a mere $19,000, whereas, punitive damages exceeded the award
over 500 fold. Id. Nonetheless, the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the
decision. Id. Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the award. Id. The
Court reasoned that the ratio between "the punitive-to-actual ratio is only 'one
of several factors' [taken into consideration when] determining whether an
award crosses the 'line' of constitutional permissibility.'" Id. See TXO
Production Corp., 509 U.S. at 459.
69. BMW of North America, 116 S. Ct. at 1613-14.
70. Id. at 1614 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at n.41, 1617 (expressing concern that the Supreme Court of the
United States is the only federal court policing this limit).
72. Id. at 1616. See TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp..
509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993) (holding that "[tihe Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a grossly excessive
punishment on a tortfeasor); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1.
21-22 (1991) (holding that punitive damages may not be -grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the offense.").
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from now on, state courts are on notice as to the words they need
used to defend their punitive damage awards. Finally, she feels
that the case will not have a significant impact because it is
unlikely that other cases will have the same compensatory to
punitive damage ratio as in the BMW case.
It is difficult to say who is right in this case. It is tempting to
say, without citing any precedent, that two million dollars for a
paint job sure seems like a lot. But, are we really dressing up a
constitutional right to make that point? In any event, I think the
Court is finished with its punitive damages cases. The test is now
articulated. Justice Ginsburg has essentially said, listen, if you
state courts want to protect your awards, here's what you say.
That seems to be the impact of this case.
By way of an overall conclusion, if you'll allow me just a
minute or two of pure conjecture, is it possible to tie these two
cases together? We look at Medtronic and its preemption. We
look at BMW and its punitive damages. We can, by way of
conjecture, postulate that the two cases will intersect in an action
involving cigarette litigation. Sooner or later, pursuant to a cause
of action that is clearly not preempted, cigarette manufacturers
are going to lose a case with significant damages attached. The
stage is set for that; the Court is now apparently taking a less
sweeping view of preemption. Before this. the Court had already
stated that causes of action for misrepresentation and fraud could
be brought against cigarette manufacturers. Some of the cigarette
companies, I think, see the writing on the wall. American Brands
is now changing its name and separating its tobacco divisions,
and transferring all their corporate debt to the tobacco divisions
as well. 73 Philip Morris and RJR are saying that they are not
going to reorganize because they are not going to lose. So if RJR
brands go down. then Fig Newtons go down with them. Very
recently, the Minnesota Attorney General said he has a memo in
which a cigarette company considered stating in 1982 that
73. See Maria Mallory, Profits: The Healthiest Thing About Cigarettes,
Bu's. WK.. May 16. 1994, at 126 (noting that even with antismoking groups
predicting courts will "pierce the tobacco companies' Teflon defense against

product liability," the $1 billion sale of American Brands' tobacco subsidiary
to BAT Industries benefited the tobacco stock market).
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cigarettes cause cancer. Sooner or later the cigarette companies
will do something that so far hasn't happened to them: they will
lose at trial, they will lose on appeal, and they will suffer a
significant damage award. 74 If that happens, and if the action is
for misrepresentation or fraud or manipulation, then both
Cipollone and Medtronics will operate to deprive the
manufacturer of the defense of preemption. In the same case, we
could see a punitive damage award into the billions. Then we will
see if the Supreme Court can resist taking the case. Indeed, what
grounds would the Court have for taking it if the BMW test is
passed. All of this, again, is pure conjecture. but it does illustrate
an area where the two cases from this term could overlap in one
specific type of litigation. For the short term, I feel we can look
to Medtronic as a case which really is a pro-plaintiff case and
keeps alive all of the significant product liability causes of action.
Thank you.
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
As we wind up today, I would like to add a note. Justice Scalia
received some mention here today. Not very much favorable.
When he was here at Touro as a distinguished jurist and resident,
he had lunch with the faculty. In the course of that, the question
of punitive damages was put to him and the comment that he
made was interesting. He said that "they" are trying to
constitutionalize punitive damages. I forget exactly what he said,
74. For information on more recent developments, see Milo Geyelin &
Suein I. Hwang, Liggett to Settle 22 States' Tobacco Suits, WALL ST. J..
March 21, 1997, at 1. The Liggett Group, Inc., as part of a settlement with 22
states and hundreds of plaintiffs, admitted to what has been suspected all
along: nicotine is addictive, smoking causes cancer and other diseases, and

tobacco companies specifically target minors. Id. In addition, the company will
contribute a quarter of its pretax earnings over the next twenty-five years into a
fund to help pay the costs of using its products. Id. As a result of Liggett's
concessions, the four largest tobacco companies filed and emergency
temporary restraining order to prevent Liggett from turning over confidential
industry documents. Id. Consequently, Liggett's threatened admissions sent
tobacco stocks spiraling on the New York Stock Exchange and the Dow Jones
Industrial Average. Id.
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but he implied that "they" are not going to succeed. He added
that when these cases get argued, you can smell the wealth in the
audience.
I would only add to what Professor Zablotsky has said, that in
my view, despite the fact that BMW's facts are rather unique,
they do provide a little bit of light at the end of the tunnel for
those who have tried, up to now, unsuccessfully to
constitutionalize the punitive damage issue. They now have a
decision that did congtitutionalize it and, of course, it will go on
from there.
Are there any questions?
The Audience:
I would like to ask the professor if he has any opinion on the
75
ultimate outcome in that Florida case.
ProfessorPeter Zablotskv:
I'm sorry?
The Audience:
There was a plaintiff's verdict in the cigarette case. The
plaintiff smoked for 44 or 45 years and he could not stop. What
is your view of that?
Professor Peter Zablotsky:

75. Recent developments in Florida include: Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 929 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.FI. 1996) (holding that the Cigarette Labeling
Act preempted plaintiff's claim that the cigarette manufacturer did not use

"non-promotional communications" to inform the public that cigarette
smoking is addictive and dangerous): Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. vs.
Carter. 680 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing the trial court's

denial of respondent's motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs have
made no showing of actual damage caused by cigarette smoking).
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I actually think that there is an excellent chance that this verdict
will survive. This is why I say that. There is a tremendous
volume of cigarette litigation. Not at the Supreme Court level, of
course, but at the trial level. And the plaintiffs have retooled after
Cipollone. They knew what was preempted in their specific field,
so now they are going with the nicotine manipulation, with
misrepresentation and with fraud cases. We are seeing some
decisions in these cases. There are not very many at this point.
But because we are seeing cases based on these causes of action
which have survived in the cigarette world, I do not know of
another reason why they could be overturned on appeal. Beyond
that, because of all of the Attorney Generals bringing suits
against cigarette companies for reimbursement, for expenses the
state disbursed for medical care, that is also another avenue. I am
not sure which type of case will get to the Appellate level first,
but I would not be surprised if it survives on appeal. The last
hurdle in these cases is assumption of risk, and if any plaintiff
recovers for early pre-warning cancer, then that will fuel these
cases all the more. But there are thousands of them just sitting
there waiting for cases like Florida to run their course and see if
they survive. So I think there's a good chance that it will survive.
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
I want to thank you for being here today, and I hope that we
will see you again next year. I promise you, for the Supreme
Court, that there will be many interesting cases next year.
Good afternoon.
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